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AERIAL SURVEILLANCE:
OVERLOOKING THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
INTRODUCTION

Aerial surveillance has evolved as an important and effective tool of
law enforcement.'

Such technologically aided sight permits law en-

forcement agents to police an area that would otherwise be unobserv-

able absent a ground search pursuant to a warrant. 2 Although high

altitude surveillance has given the government a valuable weapon for
enforcing the law, it has also increased the potential for the
invasion
3
of an individual's privacy in violation of the Constitution.
The fourth amendment 4 requires that a balance be achieved between the individual's freedom to conduct certain affairs in private
and the general public's interest in law enforcement.- The line between a person's right to be free from unreasonable searches and
society's need to effectively prevent crime must be narrowly and
continually drawn.6 In aerial surveillance, a proper balance has yet
to be struck, and the measures of allowable freedom delineated.
1. L. Kirkpatrick, The U.S. Intelligence Community: Foreign Policy and Domestic Activities 10-11 (1973); H. Ransom, The Intelligence Establishment 20-22
(1970); see S. Hochman, Satellite Spies 3-4, 8-9, 78-79, 99 (1976); Intelligence
Requirements for the 1980's: Elements of Intelligence 30 (R. Godson ed. 1979).
2. See V. Rollo, Aviation Law 1, 23 (1979); Tell, Suits Sight Spies in Sky, Nat'l
L.J., Dec. 15, 1980, at 28, col. 1.
3. United States v. Allen, 633 F.2d 1282, 1289 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 50
U.S.L.W. 3227 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1981); United States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078,
1079 (W.D. Mich. 1980); Dean v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 112. 116, 110
Cal. Rptr. 585, 588 (1973); People v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 540, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 146, 149 (1973); State v. Stachler, 58 Hawaii 412, 413-14. 570 P.2d 1323, 1325
(1977); People v. Lashmett, 71 Ill.
App. 3d 429, 430-31, 389 N.E.2d 888, 889 (1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980).
4. The fourth amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV. The fourth amendment is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949), overruledon other grounds, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 655-56 (1961).
5. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979); Mincey v.Arizona, 437 U.S.
385, 406 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 559 (1978); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
873, 878 (1975); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, I.,
dissenting); see Note, Criminal Law: Unreasonable Visual Observation Held to
Violate FourthAmendment, 55 Minn. L. Rev. 1255, 1264 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Unreasonble Visual Observation).
6. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 406 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 62-63 (1967); Miller v.
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Recent state and federal court decisions have validated aerial
searches after finding that the individual whose property was
searched had no privacy interest to be invaded. 7 Part I of this Note
criticizes these holdings. An examination of Supreme Court decisions
discussing protectable fourth amendment privacy interests reveals
that courts in aerial cases have ignored many factors relevant in
determining whether an expectation of privacy exists. Such faulty
analysis has resulted in an undermining of the very rights the fourth
amendment seeks to protect. Part II suggests a more appropriate
analysis to be utilized in determining whether an aerial search violates
a person's fourth amendment interests. Observation by plane and
helicopter has made it nearly impossible to protect privacy interests in
those portions of the land that are unobscured from aerial view.
Courts must, therefore, inquire into the very nature of this new means
of law enforcement and, as has been done in the area of electronic
surveillance, 8 circumscribe its use. It is only when the fourth amendment grows in response to the increasing capabilities of surveillance
techniques that its vitality can be retained. 9
United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 (1958); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 767
(1952) (Burton, J., dissenting).

7. E.g., United States v. Allen, 633 F.2d 1282, 1290 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.

denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3227 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1981); United States v. DeBacker, 493 F.
Supp. 1078, 1079-81 (W.D. Mich. 1980); People v. St. Amour, 104 Cal. App. 3d 886,
894, 163 Cal. Rptr. 187, 192 (1980); Burkholder v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 3d
421, 426, 158 Cal. Rptr. 86, 89 (1979); People v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. App. 3d
836, 839, 112 Cal. Rptr. 764, 765 (1974); Dean v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d
112, 117-18, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585, 589-90 (1973); State v. Stachler, 58 Hawaii 412,
421, 570 P.2d 1323, 1329 (1977); People v. Lashmett, 71 11. App. 3d 429, 431-32,

389 N.E.2d 888, 890 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980).
8. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 45-64 (1967); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 359 (1967). After Katz and Berger, Congress acknowledged the constitutional necessity for extensive regulation in the area of electronic surveillance and
enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2520 (1976). The congressional policy was to strictly limit the techniques
used to aquire information, Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 47 (1972), and
thus the statute provides rigorous guidelines for the conduct of federal and state
agencies. For a discussion of this statute, see Note, Electronic Visual Surveillance and
the Fourth Amendment: The Arrival of Big Brother?, 3 Hastings Const. L.Q. 261,
278-81 (1976). Unless explicitly authorized in the Act, all electronic interceptions of
oral communications are "flatly prohibited." Gelbard v.United States, 408 U.S. at
46. Subject to many stringent limitations, however, the statute does permit court-ordered electronic surveillance. The standard is extremely high: "normal investigative
procedures [must] have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be
unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous." 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) (1976).
The statute is designed to protect both the individual's privacy and the legitimate
goals of law enforcement. Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. at 48; S. Rep. No.
1097, 90th Cong., 2d Ses. 66, reprintedin 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2112,
2153.
9. United States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252, 1257 (D. Hawaii 1976). "[A]s the
technological capability of law enforcement agencies increases, the Fourth Amend-
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I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND
ITS TREATMENT IN AERIAL
SURVEILLANCE CASES

A. The "Reasonable Expectation" Test
The fourth amendment protects the privacy and security of indiThe amendment estabviduals, and proscribes official harassment.'
lishes an absolute prohibition against unreasonable" governmental "2
searches or seizures and, for most searches, requires police to obtain a
warrant 1 3 from an impartial judicial officer. The detached scrutiny of
a neutral magistrate is the most reliable safeguard against improper
searches and protects an individual from the potentially misguided
judgment of a law enforcement officer.' 4 It is a "cardinal principle
ment must likewise grow in response. To permit governmental intrusions . . . to
remain uncontrolled would violate the basic foundations of privacy, security and
decency which distinguish free societies from controlled societies." Id. In Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), the Court stated that "-[a] close and literal
construction deprives [constitutional provisions] of half their efficacy, and leads to
gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It
is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and
against any stealthy encroachments thereon." Id. at 454 (footnote omitted) (quoting
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886)).
10. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979): Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,
436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 53 (1967): Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967): Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-56 (1961).
(1949), overruled on other grounds. Mapp v-.
11. The fourth amendment imposes a standard of reasonableness upon the conduct of law enforcement agents, thus proscribing only searches which are deemed to
be unreasonable. Delaware v. Prouse. 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979): Zurcher v. Stanford
Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 559-60 (1978): Marshall v.Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307. 315-16
(1978); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 69 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring):
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967).
12. The fourth amendment proscription against illegal searches and seizures does
not apply to private persons, but solely to public officers. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 488 (1971): Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921). In
Burdeau, the Supreme Court stated that the fourth amendment's 'origin and history
clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign
authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental
agencies." Id. at 475.
13. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 758 (1979): Mincev v.Arizona, 437 U.S.
385, 393-94 (1978); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971): See v.
City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 546 (1967). In Coolidge, the Supreme Court stated that
the requirement for a search warrant "is not an inconvenience to be somehow
'weighed' against the claims of police efficiency. It is. or should be, an important
working part of our machinery of government, operating as a matter of course to
check the 'well-intentioned but mistakenly over-zealous executive officers' who are a
part of any system of law enforcement." 403 U.S. at 481 (quoting Couled v. United
States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921)).
14. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 395 (1978): United States v. Chadwick, 433
U.S. 1, 9 (1977); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 54-55 (1967): Camara v.
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that 'searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior

approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established

and well-delineated exceptions.'

"15

Evidence obtained from an un-

reasonable and therefore illegal search is excluded at trial.',

The threshold question in any fourth amendment analysis is

whether the individual' 7 claiming the protection has a "reasonable
expectation of privacy"' 8 in the area or item that was searched or
seized. First formulated in Katz v. United States,'9 the "reasonable

Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532-33 (1967); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S.
451, 455-56 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
15. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (quoting Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnotes omitted)); accord Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436
U.S. 307, 312 (1978); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971);
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967). Among the exceptions to
the fourth amendment's warrant requirement are: (1) a search conducted as an
incident to a lawful arrest, United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973),
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969); Agnello v. United States, 269
U.S. 20, 30 (1925); (2) a search made on grounds of "hot pursuit," Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 16 n.7
(1948); and (3) a search pursuant to the suspect's consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34-35 (1970); Zap
v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 628 (1946).
16. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85, 488 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217-18 (1960). In
early cases, the Supreme Court indicated that the exclusionary rule is an essential
part of the fourth amendment, without which the amendment would be reduced to
mere words. The purpose of the rule is to deter unlawful conduct and compel respect
for the Constitution by removing all incentive to violate it. See McDonald v. United
States, 335 U.S. 451, 453 (1948); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S.
385, 391-92 (1920); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1914). More recent
cases, however, have limited the availability of the exclusionary rule and refused to
enlarge the class of people who may invoke it. E.g., United States v. Salvucci, 448
U.S. 83, 86-87, 95 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 n.3, 137-38 (1978); see
Canon, "Is the Exclusionary Rule in FailingHealth? Some New Data and a Plea
Against a PrecipitousConclusion, 62 Ky. L.J. 681, 681-83 (1973-74); Oaks, Studying
the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665, 734-35 (1970).
17. The fourth amendment safeguards are afforded to all individuals-known or
suspected offenders of the laws as well as the innocent. Ker v. California, 374 U.S.
23, 33 (1963); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 453 (1948); Go-Bart
Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931); Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383, 392 (191,t). The rights are protected regardless of whether the search
could have been accomplished in a lawful manner. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 450-51 (1971); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385,
392 (1920). An illegal search cannot be made legal by the evidence it uncovers. Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1963); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S.
581, 595 (1948); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29-30 (1927).
18. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128, 143 (1978); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977); United States v.
White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (plurality opinion); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); accord id. at 352-53.
19. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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expectation" test requires that an individual must establish that he has
both a subjective expectation of privacy that is outwardly manifested,
and a0 privacy interest that society is willing to recognize as reason2
able.

In Katz, FBI agents, without first securing a warrant, placed sophisticated listening and recording devices on the outside of a tele-

phone booth.2 1 Evidence was accumulated revealing defendant's in-

volvement in an illegal gambling operation. -2 The defendant had,
however, closed the door to the booth and paid the toll for the call,
thereby manifesting a desire for privacy. 23 Despite the public loca-

tion and lack of physical penetration of the booth, -4 the Court held

that the agents' conduct was an unreasonable intrusion into that
privacy.2 5 The Court emphasized that it is the person and not the

place that is to be safeguarded.2-6 What a person "seeks to preserve as
private, even in'2 7an area accessible to the public, may be constitution"

ally protected.

Katz signalled an end to the use of property concepts as the sole

determinants of an expectation of privacy. 2

Indeed, subsequent to

Katz, the Court has stated that no single factor is to be dispositive in
deciding whether an individual has a reasonable privacy expecta-

20. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan's formulation of the test
was subsequently adopted by the Supreme Court in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,
143 & n.12 (1978), and more recently reaffirmed in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735, 740 (1979).
21. 389 U.S. at 348.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 352.
24. Id. at 348-49, 352-53. The Court discussed the fact that at one time the
absence of physical penetration would have foreclosed further fourth amendment
inquiry because only tangible property was thought capable of search and seizure.
Id. at 352-53. The Court concluded, however, that this concept can no longer be
controlling because it is clear that "'thereach of [the fourth] Amendment cannot turn
upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure." Id. at
353.
25. Id. at 353.
26. Id. at 351, 353. In subsequent cases, the Court has reaffirmed this proposition. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S.
1, 7 (1977); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971).
27. 389 U.S. at 351-52.
28. Id. at 353. Cases prior to Katz relied on property concepts in determining
whether a privacy expectation existed. E.g., Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S.
129, 134-35 (1942); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 456-57, 464-66 (1928);
see Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58-59 (1924). See gmerally Unreasonable
Visual Observation, supra note 5, at 1257-58; Note, From Private Places to Personal
Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth Amendment Protection, 43 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
968, 975-78 (1968) [hereinafter cited as From Private Places].
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tion.2 9 In refining the Katz test, the Court has suggested that the
relevant facts to be examined in a privacy determination may be
grouped into three general categories: (1) the property rights of the
individual; 30 (2) the precautions taken by the individual to maintain

privacy; 3' and (3) the characteristics of the property, including its
degree of accessibility to view. 32 For the "reasonable expectation"
test to be properly applied, all of these factors must be addressed.
B. The Improper Analysis

Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the fourth amendment in the context of aerial surveillance cases, 33 lower courts have
confronted the issue. 34 An overwhelming majority of these courts

29. Rakas v. Illinois. 439 U.S. 128, 152-53 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring); see
United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 92-93 (1980).
30. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 112 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring):
United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 153
(1978) (Powell, J., concurring); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 176-77
(1969). In Rakas, Justice Powell stated that "property rights reflect society's explicit
recognition of a person's authority to act as he wishes in certain areas, and therefore
should be considered in determining whether an individual's expectations of privacy
are reasonable." 439 U.S. at 153. In Alderman, the Court went so far as to hold that
an individual's vested property rights in his home entitled him to suppress evidence
illegally obtained from that home, whether or not the evidence pertained to him. 394
U.S. at 176-77.
31. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 152 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) ("the
Court has examined whether a person invoking the protection of the Fourth Amendment took normal precautions to maintain his privacy-that is, precautions customarily taken by those seeking privacy"); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11
(1977) ("[b]y placing personal effects inside a double-locked footlocker, respondents
manifested an expectation that the contents would remain free from public examination"); see Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980).
32. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,
436 U.S. 547, 570 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring); Air Pollution Variance Board v.
Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 864-65 (1974); see United States v. Salvucci,
448 U.S. 83, 92-93 (1980); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58-59 (1924); From
Private Places, supra note 28, at 983-84.
33. See United States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078, 1080 (W.D. Mich. 1980).
The implications that technologically aided visual surveillance may have on fourth
amendment protections have been briefly addressed in two Supreme Court decisions.
On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 754 (1952) (use of a transmitter to amplify
sound); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927) (use of searchlight to aid in
observation).
34. E.g., United States v. Allen, 633 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 50
U.S.L.W. 3227 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1981); United States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078
(W.D. Mich. 1980); People v. St. Amour, 104 Cal. App. 3d 886, 163 Cal. Rptr. 187
(1980); Burkholder v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 3d 421, 158 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1979);
People v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. App. 3d 836, 112 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1974); Dean v.
Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1973); People v. Sneed, 32
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validated warrantless aerial searches after concluding that the individuals claiming protection lacked the necessary privacy expectation. 35 These courts, however, improperly utilized the "reasonable
expectation" test. 36 Instead of examining all the factors deemed relevant by the Supreme Court in a fourth amendment analysis, the
courts relied almost exclusively on a single factor-the characteristics
37
of the land.
In Dean v. Superior Court,3 for example, the California Court of

Appeal indicated that the accessibility of land to view is the principal
factor in determining privacy expectations. 39 In validating a warrantless aerial search that revealed a marijuana field, the court held
that a landowner "who establishes a three-quarter-acre tract of cultivation surrounded by forests" does not have a protectable privacy
interest because such property is an open area. 40 The Hawaii Supreme Court followed Dean in State v. Stachler,'41 similarly concludCal. App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973); State v.Stachler, 58 Hawaii 412, 570
P.2d 1323 (1977); People v. Lashmett, 71 11. App. 3d 429, 389 N.E.2d 888 (1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980).
35. There was only one decision that invalidated an aerial search. In People v.
Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973), the court determined that the
search was unreasonable and, therefore, in violation of the fourth amendment. This
court's holding was greatly influenced by the extreme nature of the search; the police
helicopter flew back and forth over the 20-acre ranch and then hovered as low as 20
to 25 feet above the individual's corral. The court, however, stated that although this
search was "an obtrusive invasion of privacy [and] probably illegal . . . .appellant
certainly had no reasonable expectation of privacy from . ..airplanes and helicopters flying at legal and reasonable heights." Id. at 542-43, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 151
(footnote omitted).
36. See infra notes 37-56 and accompanying text.
37. United States v. Allen, 633 F.2d 1282, 1289, 1290-91 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3227 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1981); United States v. DeBacker, 493 F.
Supp. 1078, 1081 (W.D. Mich. 1980); Burkholder v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App.
3d 421, 427, 158 Cal. Rptr. 86, 89 (1979); Dean v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d
112, 117-18, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585, 589 (1973); State v. Stachler, 58 Hawaii 412,
418-21, 570 P.2d 1323, 1327-29 (1977); see People v. St. Amour, 104 Cal. App. 3d
886, 894, 163 Cal. Rptr. 187, 192 (1980); People v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. App. 3d
836, 840, 112 Cal. Rptr. 764, 767 (1974); People v. Lashmett, 71 111. App. 3d 429,
434, 389 N.E.2d 888, 893, (1979); cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980).
38. 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1973). In this case, the county
sheriff searched an isolated area of the Sierra foothills and observed what appeared to
be a marijuana cultivation on private property. Id. at 114, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 587.
The contraband found during a subsequent ground search was admitted at trial. Id.
at 114-15, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 587-88.
39. Id. at 117-18, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 589-90.
40. Id. at 117, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
41. 58 Hawaii 412, 570 P.2d 1323 (1977). In this case, the police conducted a
general aerial search of a sparsely populated, remote area of Hawaii looking for any
criminal activity. The police observed a patch of marijuana on defendant's land
which could not be seen after they landed. Id. at 414, 570 P.2d at 1325. Based solely
upon the information from this search, the police obtained a warrant and seized the
marijuana. Id.
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ing that an individual growing crops in an open field could not expect
privacy from aerial observation .42

By placing so much emphasis on the nature of the land, courts are
turning away from the concept that the fourth amendment protects

persons and not property interests. 43 As stated by the Supreme Court
in Katz, the physical characteristics of the land are relevant but
should not be controlling in determining a fourth amendment expectation of privacy. 44 "[W]herever an individual may harbor a reasonable 'expectation of privacy' . . . , he45 is entitled to be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion.

Because an open area of land is visible to view from the air, it is
amenable to overflight by law enforcement planes. Some courts,

therefore, turn to the regularity of these overflights to aid them in
determining whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists.4 0 In
United States v. Allen, 47 the Ninth Circuit stated that the property
owner's expectation of privacy was diminished by the fact that Coast
Guard aircraft "routinely traversed the nearby air space." 48 The

court reasoned that the residents would, no doubt, have been aware
of the routine flights and thus "could not reasonably bear a subjective
expectation of privacy." 49

State courts have also used this ap-

42. Id. at 419-20, 570 P.2d at 1328.
43. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
44. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967).
45. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (citation omitted); see Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967).
46. E.g., United States v. Allen, 633 F.2d 1282, 1290 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3227 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1981); People v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.
App. 3d 836, 839, 112 Cal. Rptr. 764, 765 (1974); State v. Stachler, 58 Hawaii 412,
419, 570 P.2d 1323, 1328 (1977); see United States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078,
1081 (W.D. Mich. 1980): Burkholder v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 3d 421, 424,
aerial
426, 158 Cal. Rptr. 86, 87, 89 (1979). The court in DeBacker validated tile
search even though it was an isolated instance. The court, however, did discuss the
fact that non-police overflights were frequent and relevant in the determination. 493
F. Supp. at 1081.
47. 633 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3227 (U.S. Oct. 5,
1981). In this case, the Coast Guard routinely flew over the defendant's ranch, which
was located in a secluded area of Oregon. Using a telephoto lens, they took photographs of private property that revealed objects which normal cameras could not
have disclosed. Id. at 1286, 1289. The property the Coast Guard observed could not
be seen from any vantage point on land or sea, id. at 1289, yet the court held the
residents did not bear an expectation of privacy from "airborne telephotographic
scrutiny." Id. at 1290.
48. Id.
49. id.
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proach,50 and in People v. Superior Court,5 1 the California Court of

Appeal indicated that, as long as the observations made from the air
could be regarded as routine, they were constitutionally valid. 52

With this approach, the courts are effectively allowing the police to
control whether an individual's expectation of privacy will be deemed

reasonable. Simply by increasing the number of flights, law enforcement officers would be able to derogate the reasonableness of an

individual's expectation.0

Such a result clearly circumvents the

fourth amendment requirement that an impartial judge be placed

between the government and the individual,5 and permits governments to control an amendment that was created to control them.55

50. E.g., People v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. App. 3d 836. 839. 112 Cal. Rptr.
764, 765 (1974); State v. Stachler, 58 Hawaii 412, 419, 570 P.2d 1323. 1327-28
(1977); see Burkholder v. Superior Court. 96 Cal. App. 3d 421, 423-26, 15S Cal.
Rptr. 86, 87-89 (1979). In Stachler, the court went so far as to expressly state this by
holding that "if it had been shown that helicopter flights were rare occurrences in the
area, the objective reasonableness of defendant's expectation of privacy would be
more credible." 58 Hawaii at 419, 570 P.2d at 1328.
51. 37 Cal. App. 3d 836, 112 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1974). In this case, a police
helicopter flew over private homes in search of stolen property. With the aid of
gyrostabilized binoculars, they observed missing auto parts in the fenced backyard of
a home. Id. at 838, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 764-65. The court emphasized that this was the
normal patrol area and the observations were routine, concluding that the residents
could not reasonably have expected privacy. Id. at 839, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 765.
52. Id. at 839, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 765.
53. See Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev.
349 (1974), in which Professor Amsterdam criticizes the idea that there can be no
expectation of privacy if the government announces often and in advance that
surveillance will occur. In a society where such notices are flashed on television
screens, no one would be free from governmental observation. Id. at 384. See United
States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 905 (9th Cir. 1973), where the court stated in dictum
that fourth amendment guarantees could not be bypassed by announcing that all
homes would be searched. Central to the individual's right of personal liberty and
privacy is the knowledge that he is not being watched. The realization that one is
being observed has a restrictive influence on even the most innocent person because it
is the observation that inhibits and makes one uneasy. Fried, Privacy, 77 Yale L.J.
475, 483-84, 490 (1968); Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 Yale L.J. 421,
447-55 (1980); Rachels, Why Privacy is Important, 4 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 323, 32:5-26
(1975). For a study of the effects on an individual being in the public eye, see E.
Goffman, Behavior in Public Places (1963).
54. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 395 (1978); United States v. Chadwick, 433
U.S. 1, 9 (1977); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1967); Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41, 54 (1967); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82
(1963); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 614-16 (1961); Jones v. United
States, 357 U.S. 493, 497-98 (1958); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451,
455-56 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-15 (1948).
55. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 395 (1978); United States v. Matlock, 415
U.S. 164, 185 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S.
451, 455-56 (1948); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532-33 (1967);
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
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The right of privacy is "too precious to entrust to the discretion of
those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of crimi[H]istory shows that the police acting on their own cannot
nals ....
be trusted." 5 6 Such lack of "policing the police" 57 potentially would
make the fourth amendment inapplicable to aerial searches, a result
hardly commensurate with logic or justice.
The analysis consistent with Katz and its progeny is that even
though activities are conducted in an open area and are accessible to
view from above, they are entitled to fourth amendment protections if
the individual affirmatively manifests a subjective expectation of privacy that is reasonable. To permit a contrary conclusion would require that a property owner erect an impenetrable enclosure-a conclusion that is neither required by, nor compatible with, established
fourth amendment principles.
II. THE PROPER APPROACH FOR DETERMINING
PRIVACY EXPECTATIONS IN AERIAL SURVEILLANCE
Courts confronted with warrantless searches are bound to follow
fourth amendment principles in analyzing whether an individual has
a reasonable expectation of privacy. 58 To preserve the integrity of the
amendment, the judiciary must address those factors deemed relevant
by the Supreme Court: property rights, precautions taken, and characteristics of the land. Moreover, in aerial surveillance cases, there is a
fourth factor that is crucial to the determination. Because use of
aircraft creates a capability to observe and search heretofore unavailable, courts must evaluate the effect that this new surveillance
method has on the rights that the fourth amendment serves to protect.5 9
A. Property Rights
Property ownership reflects society's recognition that a person may
act as he desires in certain private areas.60 The Supreme Court has
56. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948). The Court also
stated that "[a]bsent some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a
magistrate between the citizen and the police. This was done not to shield criminals
nor to make the home a safe haven for illegal activities. It was done so that an
objective mind might weigh the need to invade that privacy in order to enforce the
law." Id. at 455.
57. Amsterdam, supra note 53, at 370-71.
58. See supra notes 17-20, 29-32 and accompanying text.
59. See United States v. Curtis, 562 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1977) ("The three
judges here concerned wish to make it clear that in this age of ever-advancing
sophistication in the development of electronic eavesdropping devices, they are not
insensitive to unjustifiable intrusions on the right of privacy, a right that is deemed to
be most precious to the American people."), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978).
60. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 153 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring).
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stated that "one who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property
will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue
of [the] right to exclude.-'6 The right to exclude is a fundamental
right attaching to property and belonging only to one in rightful
possession. 2 An individual's interest in property is, therefore, of
great 63
significance in determining whether an expectation of privacy
exists.
In aerial surveillance cases, however, a landowner may claim ex-

clusive possession only of as much overlying airspace as he can reasonably use or enjoy. 64 This limitation on the landowner's right to
airspace over his property has resulted in courts limiting his expecta-

tion of privacy in the land below. In Burkholder v. Superior Court,6 5

for example, the California Court of Appeal indicated that observation of defendant's land from an aircraft flying at a lawful altitude in

navigable airspace could not constitute a violation of his expectation

of privacy. 66 Because no trespass occurred, the aerial search was held
67
to be valid.

To trigger fourth amendment protections, however, the Supreme

Court has stated that a physical trespass is no longer necessaryc

The

landowner's lack of a proprietary interest in the airspace is therefore
irrelevant. It is the property right in the article or area actually
searched that is significant. In aerial surveillance cases, the individual, as owner or occupier of the land,69 did indeed have a right to

61. Id. at 143 n.12 (1978).
62. Id.
63. Id.; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.. concurring).
64. Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 799-800 (1972): Griggs v. Allegheny County,
369 U.S. 84, 88-89 (1962); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264-65 (1946);: see
Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 143 & n.5 (1978).
65. 96 Cal. App. 3d 421, 158 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1979).
66. Id. at 426, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 89. Congress has enacted numerous provisions
dealing with the airspace overlying the United States. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542
(1976). Navigable airspace is defined as "airspace above the minimum altitudes of
flight prescribed by regulations issued under this chapter." 49 U.S.C. § 1301(26)
(1976).
67. Id.; accordUnited States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078, 1079, 1081 (W.D.
Mich. 1980); People v. St. Amour, 104 Cal. App. 3d 886, 893, 163 Cal. Rptr. 187,
191 (1980); State v. Stachler, 58 Hawaii 412, 418-19, 570 P.2d 1323, 1328 (1977):
People v. Lashmett, 71 Ill. App. 3d 429, 431-32, 389 N.E.2d 888, 890 (1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980).
68. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967); see United States v.
Vilhotti, 323 F. Supp. 425, 431 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 452 F.2d 1186
(2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972).
69. See United States v. Allen, 633 F.2d 1282, 1286 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
50 U.S.L.W. 3227 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1981); United States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp.
1078, 1079 (W.D. Mich. 1980); People v. St. Amour, 104 Cal. App. 3d 886, 890, 163
Cal. Rptr. 187, 190 (1980); Burkholder v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 3d 421,
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exclude others from the property searched. Whether the property

owner has manifested an intent to exercise this right is also instrumental in ascertaining whether an expectation of privacy exists.
B. Precautions Taken
The Supreme Court has placed great emphasis on the precautions

that an individual takes to preserve his privacy. 70

The precautions

taken need not be extreme to invoke constitutional protections; 7' a

person does not have to "construct an opaque bubble" over his property to maintain an expectation of privacy. 72 In Katz, all the defend-

ant needed to do was close the door of the telephone booth. 73 In
other cases, by closing a toilet stall door, 74 locking a footlocker, 75

424-25, 158 Cal. Rptr. 86, 88 (1979); Dean v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 112,
115, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585, 587 (1973); State v. Stachler, 58 Hawaii 412, 413, 570 P.2d
1323, 1325 (1977); People v. Lashmett, 71 Il.App. 3d 429, 430-31, 389 N.E.2d 888,
889 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980).
70. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 152-53 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring);
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977); see United States v. Taborda, 635
F.2d 131, 137-38 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Vilhotti, 323 F. Supp. 425, 431
(S.D.N.Y.) aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 452 F.2d 1186 (2d Cir. 1971) cert. denied, 406
U.S. 947 (1972); 1 W. Ringel, Searches & Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 8.1, at
8-2 (2d ed. 1980). Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that the fourth amendment
protections extend to those people, places, items, or activities "for which there is a
reasonable expectation of privacy, or at least [those] that the owner or possessor
intended to be private." Rehnquist, Is an Expanded Right of Privacy Consistent with
Fairand Effective Law Enforcement? or: Privacy, You've Come a Long Way, Baby,
23 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1974).
71. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 152-53 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (the
precautions necessary to maintain privacy categorized as merely "normal. . .that is,
precautions customarily taken by those seeking privacy"); see United States v. McMillan, 350 F. Supp. 593, 596 (D.D.C. 1972) (physical condition of property indicated
that it was an area where she had a reasonable expectation of privacy).
72. United States v.Allen, 633 F.2d 1282, 1289 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 50
U.S.L.W. 3227 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1981).
73. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967). The Court held that an
individual may justifiably rely on privacy while using a telephone, stating that "[olne
who occupies [a telephone booth], shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that
permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into
the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world." Id.
74. See Kroehler v. Scott, 391 F. Supp. 1114, 1117-18 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Britt v.
Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 469, 472, 374 P.2d 817, 819, 24 Cal. Rptr. 849, 851
(1962); Bielicki v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 602, 607-09, 371 P.2d 288, 291-92, 21
Cal. Rptr. 552, 555 (1962); State v. Bryant, 287 Minn. 205, 211, 177 N.W.2d 800,
804 (1970).
75. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977) ("By placing personal
effects inside a double-locked footlocker, respondents manifested an expectation that
the contents would remain free from public examination.").
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growing grass very high, 76 or building a tall fence,7 7 the individual

sufficiently manifested an expectation of privacy that merited protection from warrantless searches.
In People v. St. Amour, 78 branches, leaves and shrubbery were used
as camouflage, and outsiders were forbidden entry by signs and a
fence.7 In validating the aerial search, the court stated that the
owner of land cannot invoke fourth amendment protections against
intrusion from the air by taking precautions to defend property from
earthly encroachments.8 0 Other courts have reached similar results
despite defendants implementing measures to preclude visual detection and to restrict access to the public. 8 1 Such analysis is clearly a
departure from the Supreme Court guidelines.
To avoid the atmosphere of a police state, an individual's efforts to

protect himself or his property from surveillance must be given great
deference in a court's determination of whether a privacy interest
exists. A person may always "protect himself against surveillance by

retiring to the cellar, cloaking all the windows with thick caulking,

turning off the lights and remaining absolutely quiet." 8 2 Such with-

drawal, however, is clearly not necessary. Indeed, an individual must
be free to use 3open land which he lawfully possesses without Orwell8
ian scrutiny.
76. State v. Kender, 60 Hawaii 301, 305, 588 P.2d 447, 450 (1978) (holding that
"the growth of California grass ... created a natural barrier behind which [the
defendant] could reasonably expect privacy"); see People v. Fly, 34 Cal. App. 3d
665, 667, 110 Cal. Rptr. 158, 159-60, (1973); State v. Fearn, 345 So. 2d 468, 469-70
(La. 1977).
77. State v. Boynton, 58 Hawaii 530, 535-36, 574 P.2d 1330, 1334 (1978); State
v. Lakin, 588 S.W.2d 544, 549 (Tenn. 1979).
78. 104 Cal. App. 3d 886, 163 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1980).
79. Id. at 890, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
80. Id. at 892, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 190-91.
81. United States v. Allen, 633 F.2d 1282, 1286 (9th Cir. 1980) (secluded area,
no trespassing" signs, and a gate), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3227 (U.S. Oct. 5,
1981); United States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078, 1079 (W.D. Mich. 1980) ("no
trespassing" signs, a fence and surrounded by crops "designed to keep [the area]
hidden from view"); Burkholder v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 3d 421, 424, 158
Cal. Rptr. 86, 87-88 (1979) (enclosed by trees, "no trespassing" signs and a locked
gate); People v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. App. 3d 836, 838, 112 Cal. Rptr. 764, 765
(1974) (five foot fence completely enclosed the area); People v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App.
3d 535, 539, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146, 148 (1973) (inside a corral hidden by 10 to 12 foot
high crops); State v. Stachler, 58 Hawaii 412, 413, 570 P.2d 1323, 1325 (1977)
(surrounded by abandoned farms and locked with a gate); People v.Lashmett, 71111.
App. 3d 429, 432, 389 N.E.2d 888, 890 (1979) (entire area fenced in), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1081 (1980).
82. Amsterdam, supra note 53, at 402.
83. G. Orwell, 1984 (1949); accord Lorenzana v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 626,
637, 511 P.2d 33, 41, 108 Cal. Rptr. 585, 593 (1973). The court warns against a time
"in which a citizen, in order to preserve a modicum of privacy, would be compelled
to encase himself in a light-tight, air-proof box. The shadow of 1984 has fortunately
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C. Characteristicsof the Land
The proper way to utilize the characteristics of the land is as one of
many factors necessary to determine a reasonable expectation of privacy. 84 The property most commonly involved in aerial cases is
isolated, rural land. As shown above, courts often seize upon this
characteristic, but incorrectly emphasize that this type of land is
accessible to aerial view 85 and that pleasure crafts and cropdusting
planes actually fly overhead. 86 Overflights in rural areas are considered "consistent with the common habits of persons engaged in agrarian pursuits."'8 7 Because a rural dweller is accustomed to civilian
overflights, courts assume that the individual cannot have a reasonable expection of privacy from police flights.
The major flaw with this analysis is that even if there are non-police
flights, there is no reason for the property owner to perceive that the
passengers or pilots of such planes will scrutinize the land below in
search of contraband. For example, a property owner would not
expect a cropduster to be searching, only that he would be cropdusting.
A person should be able to "'demand privacy unless a policeman
can see or hear [him] from a place accessible to those members of the
public not preternaturally inquisitive.""'8 The measure to be ap-

not yet fallen upon us." Id. The use of sophisticated surveillance techniques Is
bringing us into an "age where everyone is open to surveillance at all times." Osborn
v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 341 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting). The result of
such technological advances is that the privacy and dignity of the public is being
whittled away, leaving us in a "society in which the government may intrude into the
secret regions of man's life at will." Id. at 343; S. Hochman, Satellite Spies 78-79
(1976).
84. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
85. United States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078, 1081 (W.D. Mich. 1980)
(aerial surveillance over "open fields"); People v. St. Amour, 104 Cal. App. 3d 886,
890, 163 Cal. Rptr. 187, 189 (1980) (open area on a mountain slope); Burkholder v.
Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 3d 421, 425, 158 Cal. Rptr. 86, 88 (1974) (land devoted
to the cultivation of contraband); People v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. App. 3d 836,
838, 112 Cal. Rptr. 764, 765 (1974) (residential backyard open to view from above);
Dean v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 117, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585, 589 (1973)
App. 3d
(three-quarter-acre tract of open cultivation); People v. Lashmett, 71 Ill.
429, 431, 389 N.E.2d 888, 889 (1979) (open feedlot on farm), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1081 (1980).
86. United States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078, 1081 (W.D. Mich. 1980);
Dean v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 117, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585, 589 (1973);
State v. Stachler, 58 Hawaii 412, 418-19, 570 P.2d 1323, 1328 (1977).
87. Burkholder v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 3d 421, 425, 158 Cal. Rptr. 86,
88 (1979); accord People v. St. Amour, 104 Cal. App. 3d 886, 891, 163 Cal. Rptr.
187, 190 (1980); Dean v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 117, 110 Cal. Rptr.
585, 589 (1973).
88. United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting
United States v. Taborda, 491 F. Supp. 50, 53 (E.D.N.Y. 1980)).
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plied, therefore, is natural curiosity.8 9 Police lacking a warrant are
permitted to intrude only to the same extent as a "reasonably respectful" individual.9 0 Furthermore, different expectations of privacy exist with respect to different people. 9 ' The fact that a private citizen
has intruded or may intrude does not entitle the police to do the
same.9 2 There may be no reasonable expectation of privacy against a
child wandering into a backyard, yet there9 3may be one against a
policeman making a search of the same area.
The proper question is whether the characteristics and location of
the property make a view of the area accessible to the naturally
curious observer. 4 The characteristics of the land in most aerial
cases 95 should have led to a finding of a reasonable expectation of

89. United States v.Vilhotti, 323 F. Supp. 425, 431 (S.D.N.Y.), ajJ'd in part,
rev'd in part, 452 F.2d 1186 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972); see
United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 869-70 (5th Cir. 1975); James v. United
States, 418 F.2d 1150, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
90. United States v. Vilhotti, 323 F. Supp. 425, 431 (S.D.N.Y.), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 452 F.2d 1186 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972).
91. E.g., Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 329 (1979) (retail store
open to public observation but not to warrantless governmental searches); Marshall
v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1978) (employee permitted to view daily
functions of employer's business for purpose of reporting OSHA violations, but
government agent is not allowed to observe without a warrant); United States v.
Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951) (maid, janitor, or repairman may enter hotel room but
police without a warrant may not).
92. United States v. Averell, 296 F. Supp. 1004, 1009 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) (airline
employee may inspect shipments while law enforcement agents may not), United
States v. Masterson, 251 F. Supp. 937, 939-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (trustee in bankruptcy
who seizes records does not violate the fourth amendment although government
agents would), aff'd, 383 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 954 (1968).
93. State v. Stanton, 7 Or. App. 286, 296-97, 490 P.2d 1274, 1279 (1971).
Similarly, college students have been held to have a legitimate expectation of privacy
from a police search pursuant to a criminal investigation, although not from an
inspection by school authorities pursuant to university regulations. Piazzola v.
Watkins, 442 F.2d 284, 289-90 (5th Cir. 1971); Commonwealth v. MeCloskey, 217
Pa. Super. Ct. 432, 434, 272 A.2d 271, 272 (1970).
94. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
95. United States v. Allen, 633 F.2d 1282, 1286 (9th Cir. 1980) (200 acres of
coastal property in secluded area of Oregon), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3227 (U.S.
Oct. 5, 1981); United States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078, 1079 (W.D. Mich.
1980) (sparsely-populated area of Michigan bordered by a forest and surrounded by
crops); People v. St. Amour, 104 Cal. App. 3d 886, 890, 163 Cal. Rptr. 187, 189
(1980) (mountain slope in a deserted area, miles away from any town); Burkholder v.
Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 3d 421, 424, 158 Cal. Rptr. 86, 87 (1979) (heavily
wooded, mountainous area enclosed by trees); Dean v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App.
3d 112, 114, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585, 587 (1973) (isolated area of Sierra foothills surrounded by hills and woods); People v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 540, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 146, 149 (1973) (20-acre ranch not visible from any road); State v. Stachler, 58
Hawaii 412, 413, 570 P.2d 1323, 1325 (1977) (sparsely-populated and remote area of
Hawaii, adjacent to a forest and surrounded by abandoned farms and trees).
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privacy. In Dean, for example, the court conceded that the property
searched was an "isolated area of the Sierra foothills ... hidden from
view by the surrounding hills and woods."9' 0 The Supreme Court of

Hawaii in Stachler also noted that the aerial surveillance took place
over a sparsely populated and relatively remote area adjacent to a

forest and surrounded by abandoned coffee farms, wild growth and
numerous trees.1

7

Yet in both of these cases, the courts incorrectly

applied the characteristics factor and held that no reasonable expec-

tion of privacy existed. 98 If an individual inhabits an area which is

sparsely populated or difficult to reach, an expectation that his activities or property remain unobserved is more probable than that of an

urban dweller whose every move is likely to be viewed by a casual
passerby. 99

D. The Method of Surveillance as
a Fourth Factor
Few "unenclosed locations . . . [can]not be observed from some
airborne location."10 0 Aircraft used in police searches, therefore, can
greatly affect an individual's ability to protect his privacy interest. To
ensure that the fourth amendment keeps pace with this advance in
surveillance, courts must consider the method employed by the police
as a fourth factor in determining a reasonable expectation of privacy.
The aerial cases fail to properly account for the significance of the
method of surveillance. Some courts justify warrantless aerial surveillance by stating that the object or area was in "open view" and,
therefore, no invasion into a privacy expectation could have occurred.101 The origin of this approach is the "open fields" exception

96. 35 Cal. App. 3d at 114, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 587.
97. 58 Hawaii at 413, 570 P.2d at 1325.
98. Dean v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 118-19, 110 Cal, Rptr. 585,
589-90 (1973); State v. Stachler, 58 Hawaii 412, 419, 570 P.2d 1323, 1328 (1977).
99. People v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 541, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146, 150 (1973);
State v. Kender, 60 Hawaii 301, 303-04, 588 P.2d 447, 449-50 (1979); People v.
App. 3d 429, 436, 389 N.E.2d 888, 893 (1979), cert. denied, 444
Lashmett, 71 Ill.
U.S. 1081 (1980).
100. United States v. Allen, 633 F.2d 1282, 1289 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 50
U.S.L.W. 3227 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1981).
101. E.g., People v. St. Amour, 104 Cal. App. 3d 886, 894, 163 Cal. Rptr. 187,
192 (1980) ("marijuana cultivation was in plain view"); Burkholder v. Superior
Court, 96 Cal. App. 3d 421, 425, 158 Cal. Rptr. 86, 88 (1979) ("contraband Is
plainly visible"); State v. Stachler, 58 Hawaii 412, 421, 570 P.2d 1323, 1329 (1977)
("marijuana patch was open to ...view"); People v. Lashmett, 71111. App. 3d 429,
431, 389 N.E.2d 888, 890 (1979) ("machinery was in clear view"), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1081 (1980). In Stachler, the court explained that a search implies the seeking
out of something that is concealed and that there is no search to observe that which is
fully disclosed. 58 Hawaii at 416, 570 P.2d at 1326-27.
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to the fourth amendment.' 0 2 That exception has historically been
used as an independent justification for validating warrantless
searches.'0 3 The analysis underlying the "open fields" doctrine em-

phasized the nature of the land, reasoning that there simply is no
search if the area observed is land fully visible to the public.' 04 An
object in "open view," therefore, falls outside the protections of the

fourth amendment.' 05
By not considering the method of surveillance that was employed
by the police, however, courts in aerial cases distort the "'open view"

analysis. Although it is axiomatic that something is not in open view if

police must resort to unusual means to penetrate or extraordinary

steps to obtain a glimpse,' 0 6 courts improperly ignore the methods

employed and conclude that the property searched was out in the

open.' 0 7 The protections of the fourth amendment are emasculated

by finding that a field or yard, purposely concealed and unobservable
except by aircraft, is in "open view." The correct analysis must be that

the vantage point of the officer, as well as the method of surveillance

102. E.g., United States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078, 1079-81 (W.D. Mich.
1980); Burkholder v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 3d 421, 427, 158 Cal. Rptr. 86,
89-90 (1979); Dean v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 116-17, 110 Cal. Rptr.
585, 589 (1973); State v. Stachler, 58 Hawaii 412, 416-17, 570 P.2d 1323, 1326-28
(1977).
103. This exception was first enunciated in Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57
(1924), where the Supreme Court stated that "the special protection accorded by the
Fourth Amendment to the people in their 'persons, houses, papers, and effects,' is not
extended to the open fields." Id. at 59. It has been recognized in subsequent cases. Air
Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 865 (1974); United
States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927); United States v. Jackson, 588 F.2d 1046,
1053-54 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979), Janney v. United States, 206
F.2d 601, 604 (4th Cir. 1953); Martin v. United States, 155 F.2d 503, 505 (5th Cir.
1946).
104. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924); see Air Pollution Variance
Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 864-65 (1974); United States v. Sorce,
325 F.2d 84, 86 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 931 (1964); Monnette v.
United States, 299 F.2d 847, 850 (5th Cir. 1962); Giacona v. United States, 257 F.2d
450, 456 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 873 (1958).
105. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Justice Harlan explained that something exposed to the open view of a member of the
public is not protected under the fourth amendment because no intention to keep it
private has been exhibited. Id.
106. 1 W. Ringel, Searches & Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 8.2(c), at 8-16
(2d ed. 1980); see United States v. Resnick, 455 F.2d 1127, 1132 (5th Cir. 1972);
James v. United States, 418 F.2d 1150, 1151 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1969); State v. Kender,
60 Hawaii 301, 304-05, 588 P.2d 447, 450 (1978); Mann v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d
1, 7, 472 P.2d 468, 471, 88 Cal. Rptr. 380, 383 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023

(1971).
107. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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he employs, should play an important role in determining whether

what was observed is in "open view."' 0 8
The method utilized by law enforcement agents should play an
integral part not only in determining whether an object or area is in
"open view," but also whether the individual has a reasonable expec-

tation of privacy. In fourth amendment aerial cases, the surveillance
means has never been been used to bolster a finding of protectable
privacy. Courts in the analogous area of trade secrets, however, have
indicated that the methods employed may be critical in the determination of whether an individual has an interest to protect.100

Just as a reasonable expectation of privacy must exist before an

individual may claim a violation of his fourth amendment rights,"10 a

valid protectable trade secret must exist before an individual may
claim a violation of his business rights."' In determining whether
particular information is a trade secret, courts consider the precautions taken to preserve the interest" 2 as well as "the ease or 3difficulty
with which the information might be properly acquired.""
108. See Kroehler v. Scott, 391 F. Supp. 1114, 1119 (E.D. Pa. 1975). The vantage
point and the method by which the law enforcement agents conducted their surveillance was determinative in finding the search to be in violation of the fourth amendment. Id.; Lorenzana v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 626, 629, 511 P.2d 33, 35, 108
Cal. Rptr. 585, 587 (1973); Pate v. Municipal Court, 11 Cal. App. 3d 721, 724, 89
Cal. Rptr. 893, 895 (1970); State v. Kender, 60 Hawaii 301, 305, 588 P.2d 447, 450
(1979); From Private Places, supra note 28, at 986-87.
109. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1017 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971); see Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416
U.S. 470, 476 (1974); Mycalex Corp. of Am. v. Pemco Corp., 64 F. Supp. 420,
422-24 (D. Md. 1946), aff'd, 159 F.2d 907 (4th Cir. 1947). See generally Orenbuch,
Trade Secrets and the Patent Laws, 52 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 638 (1970); Stedman, Trade
Secrets, 23 Ohio St. L.J. 4 (1962); Comment, IndustrialEspionage: Piracy of Secret
Scientific and Technical Information, 14 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 911 (1967); Comment,
Theft of Trade Secrets: The Need for a Statutory Solution, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev. 378
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Theft of Trade Secrets].
110. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
111. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474-75 (1974); G. Alexander, Commercial Torts § 3.1, at 206-07, § 3.1, at 25 (1973 & Supp. 1979); D. Burge,
Patent and Trademark Tactics and Practices § 20-4, at 154 (1980). See generally
Mahon, Trade Secrets and Patents Compared, 50 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y. 536, 537-39
(1968); Note, Patent Preemption of Trade Secret Protection of Inventions Meeting
JudicialStandards of Patentability,87 Harv. L. Rev. 807, 809-10 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Patent Preemption].
112. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016-17 (5th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971). The court stated that society's
"tolerance of the espionage game must cease when the protections required to prevent another's spying cost so much that the spirit of inventiveness is dampened." Id.
at 1016; accord Mycalex Corp. of Am. v. Pemco Corp., 64 F. Supp. 420, 423 (D.
Md. 1946), aff'd, 159 F.2d 907 (4th Cir 1947); G. Alexander, Commercial Torts §
3.1, at 207 (1973); R. Ellis, Trade Secrets § 239, at 32,4-25 (1953).
113. Mycalex Corp. of Am. v. Pemco Corp., 64 F. Supp. 420, 423 (D. Md. 1946),
aff'd, 159 F.2d 907 (4th Cir. 1947); see R. Ellis, Trade Secrets § 14, at 28 (1953);
Stedman, Trade Secrets, 23 Ohio St. L.J. 4, 5 (1962).
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In E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher,14 the Fifth Circuit was confronted with the question of whether defendant's aerial
observation of a plant construction site constituted an improper means
of obtaining a trade secret." 5 After examining both the precautions

taken1 1 6 and the means utilized,

17

the court concluded that plaintiff

s

had a protectable trade secretI and that the defendant's method of
discovering it was wrongful."19 The fact that extraordinary means
were necessary to obtain the view suggested that the protective mea-

sures taken were sufficient to establish the existence of a secret. 20

Similarly, in a fourth amendment analysis, the means employed by

law enforcement agents should be assessed in determining whether an
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy. If a view may not

be had unless a helicopter or plane is used, the presumption must be
that a protectable expectation exists. The lengths to which the police

serve to define and confirm the reasonableness of the expectamust12go
1

tion.

The proper approach to take in evaluating a fourth amendment
claim is first to consider the means utilized when determining whether
something is in "open view" to the casual passerby. If an overflight is
necessary to observe activity and precautions have been taken to
prevent ground observation, there is no "open view." It is not reasonable to assume that those members of the public not preternaturally
inquisitive will seek access by the air. If there is no such "'open view,'"
then there is a search and a fourth amendment analysis is triggered. In

114. 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971).
115. Id. at 1015. See Restatement of Torts § 757(a) (1939). which states that an
individual is liable to another if "he discovered the [trade] secret by improper
means .. " Id.
116. 431 F.2d at 1013, 1016-17. The court noted that "-[p]erhaps ordinary fences
and roofs must be built to shut out incursive eyes, but we need not require the
discoverer of a trade secret to guard against the unanticipated, the undetectable, or
the unpreventable methods of espionage now available." Id. at 1016.
117. Id. at 1013, 1016-17.
118. Id. at 1016.
119. Id. at 1015, 1017. Aerial reconnaissance was held to be an improper means
regardless of altitude or whether the flights violated any federal aviation regulations.
Id.; see Patent Preemption, supra note 1i1, at 810 & n.20. For a discussion of the
E.I. duPont case, see Theft of Trade Secrets, supra note 109, at 385-89.
120. 431 F.2d at 1015; see Restatement of Torts § 757 comment a, (1939)("The
significant difference of fact between trade secrets and processes or devices which are
not secret is that knowledge of the latter is available to the copier without the use of
...
).
improper means to procure it.
121. State v. Kender, 60 Hawaii 301, 307, 588 P.2d 447, 451 (1979); see Kroehler
v. Scott, 391 F. Supp. 1114, 1119 (E.D. Pa. 1975); From Private Places, supra note
28, at 986-87.
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determining whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of
privacy, the means must once again be considered. When evidence
may only be discovered by such means as overflight surveillance, the
difficulty of that acquisition suggests that the expectation of privacy
was reasonable.
CONCLUSION

Personal liberty and freedom from arbitrary and unreasonable police invasion are endangered whenever an individual's reasonable
expectation of privacy can easily be derogated by technology. The
increased use of warrantless aerial surveillance as an investigative
technique jeopardizes personal liberty. The absence of a warrant
requirement in aerial cases is inconsistent with prior judicial and
statutory responses 2 2 to the use of electronic surveillance. Demanding
a warrant and judicial supervision prior to aerial intrusion will inevitably entail extra effort on the part of government. Fourth amendment protections, however, may not be disregarded for mere efficiency's sake. "Duties of law enforcement officials are extremely
demanding in a free society. But that
is as it should be. A policeman's
23
job is easy only in a police state." 1
Susan A. Higgins

122. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.

123. People v. Spinelli, 35 N.Y.2d 77, 82, 315 N.E.2d 792, 795, 358 N.Y.S.2d 743,
748 (1974).

